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In the five years after unification, efforts to bring up the eastern
part of Germany to the level of the western one have made con-
siderable progress. Eastern Germany's growth is moving towards
the double digits, just like growth in the Pacific Rim region. But
not all things have developed as well as they might. Rapid wage
convergence has caused enormous unemployment in the east and
a heavy tax burden in financing massive transfer payments in the
west.
The paper analyses the catching up of the eastern German econ-
omy against the background of the unpleasant trade-off between
the pace of wage increase and the level of transfer payments nec-
essary to spur investment and to finance consumption. It describes
— first, the two-pronged policy mix to reconstruct and modern-
ize the eastern German economy on a firm level, and,
- second, typical adjustment profiles for the economy as a
whole with regard to capital stock, output, and employment.
Finally, it discusses the key policy question of how the high un-
employment as well as the high costs of public assistance could be
reduced (P52).I United but not yet a Unity: The Five Years after the "Big Bang"
1
Five years ago, in the euphoria of unification, the German Chancellor
Dr. Helmut Kohl promised the east Germans "blossoming landscapes" — in con-
trast to the dreary scenery of smoky stacks and rusty tubes inherited from the so-
cialist regime. Since then, nearly one trillion Deutschmark (US$ 700 billion) have
been pumped from west to east. Results seem to justify the efforts. East Ger-
many's economic revival is impressive by any standards. Growth rates come close
to the double digits, just like those in south-east Asia. The question whether Ger-
man unification will become an economic success, can be answered clearly: yes.
Nevertheless, many Germans from east and west agree, at least, that things have
not gone as well as they might. Until now the east and the west are still like un-
equal twins. Even healthy growth has brought output in eastern Germany just
back to the pre-unification level. The economic clasm is reflected by the region's
poor contribution of less than 10 percent to the all German GDP — compared to
a share of 20 percent in total population. Consequently, per capita GDP ac-
counted only for 50 percent of west Germany's equivalent. Even if high growth
sustains, it will need at least ten more years to close the gap [Siebert 1995].
In.early blueprints for unification the deplorable state of the eastern German
economy had not been completely recognized. There was a widespread feeling
that it would be possible to restructure and modernize the old socialist conglom-
erates and enterprises in a relatively short period of time. In this respect, eastern
Germany seemed to be luckier than its eastern neighbour countries as it could
The paper was presented at the Pacific Rim Allied Economic Organizations Conference held
in Hong Kong from 11-15 January 1996. I gratefully acknowledge the excellent help of
Birgit Sander and Wolfgang Winkler.count on financial and managerial resources of western Germany. However, two
things thwarted such expectations: the political decision to establish the Deutsch-
mark as Currency at parity (the black market exchange rate for the average of the
years 1987 to 1989 was 14:1), and dynamic wage increases brought up eastern
Germany's unit labour costs to a level more than twice as high as in the west. The
capital stock which had some positive value under socialism became to a great
extent depreciated overnight. It has to be built up from scratch.
As a consequence, the costs accruing to western Germany for supporting the east-
ern G.erman economy have been immense. The easterners' aspirations for wages,
jobs and social provisions could only be fulfilled by means of massive transfer
payments. Since the east produces only 60 percent of what it consumes and
invests, a huge trade balance deficit has to be financed by the west. From 1990 to
1995 the deficit in the current account accumulated to about 1,250 bn DM; two
thirds of it were financed by public transfer payments. Although the united Ger-
many has absorbed such deficits (which temporarily amounted to 6 percent of its
GDP) with the Deutschmark stronger than ever and interest rates lower than in
most other countries, it is evident that they must be reduced considerably in the
years to come.
There is a plethora of books and articles dealing with the German unification.
2
They illustrate the wide range of issues — e.g., the establishment of the German
Economic, Monetary and Social Union (GEMSU), the privatization and restruc-
turing of state-owned enterprises or the financing of unification costs and their
strain on the public budgets — and the wide range of opinions about them, too.
Among English-language publications, for instance, Lipschitz and McDonald [1990],
Akerlof et-al. [1991], Bae [1993], Burda and Funke [1993], Dennis [1993], Ghaussy and
Schafer [1993], Schatz and Schmidt [1992], Steinherr [1994], Siebert [1990, 1994, 1995],
Behrend [1995], Carlin and Richthofen [1995].The focus of this paper is of limited scope: it studies the real adjustment process
in the east German economy under the given constraint of wage convergence. It
describes first, the two-pronged policy mix to reconstruct and modernize the
economy on the firm level, second, typical adjustment profiles with regard to
capital stock, output and employment, and third, the main distortions in the
structural pattern of the economy. Finally, it discusses the key policy questions:
how can high unemployment as well as large-scale public assistance be reduced.
II Wage Convergence ahead of Efficiency Convergence: The Wrong
Model for Merging Two Economies
To understand the long and troublesome unification process it has to be empha-
sized that — compared to other economies in transition — the eastern German
economy is a special case. The task has not only been to transform the economy
from a centrally planned system into a market system but also to integrate it into
the western German one. Both economies have been rather different with respect
to their level of development, factor endowment, sectoral structure and interna-
tional competitiveness. What could be expected to happen if two such different
economies are merged? If the standard model of integration is applied, one would
conclude the following [Siebert 1990, Schmidt and Naujoks 1995]:
First: Both economies will extend and diversify bilateral trade according to
their factor endowment, specialization and productivity differentials. In
the short term the superior economy will display its comparative advan-
tages in tradables and will gain a huge export surplus. The inferior econ-
omy will suffer from an import deficit which must be financed by foreign
capital or transfers from abroad.Second: Both economies will export their excess of mobile resources: the supe-
rior economy will export capital and technology while in the inferior
economy will export labour and land. In the short run the transfer of
mobile resources will avoid bottlenecks in the factor markets, in the long
run it serves to equate differences in productivity, real wages and profits.
Third: Both economies will adjust production structures according to their long
run comparative advantages. The size of required structural adjustment
depends on the extent of distortions. It is much higher in the inferior
economy than in the superior one. In the short-run scenario the inferior
economy will undergo a process of de-industrialization, although in the
long run a re-industrialization is likely to occur. In the case that produc-
tion structures are identical (albeit of different efficiency levels) an intra-
industry specialization will emerge leading to more or less substitutive
structures in the two economies.
There is always some evidence that the collapse of the eastern German economy
after the unification shock is in full congruence with the standard Heckscher-
Ohliri model which is based on factor endowment, factor prices and factor move-
ments. It predicts that things must become worse before they can get better. How-
ever, the crucial point is that the model is based on the assumption that factor
prices are determined by relative scarcity. In this model it is assumed that huge
wage differences exist reflecting the backwardness of the inferior economy and,
hence, the gap in productivity. All that is far from the German reality. From the
start, the basic problem has been the large jump in real wages which — in combi-
nation with the appreciation of the real exchange rate — pushed up unit labour
costs. In the meantime, the wage differentials — at the outset on average 1:3 for
east versus west — have been equalized to a great extent. As a result, Germanunification has thus far featured a combination of high unemployment in the east
and high fiscal burden due to massive transfer payments in the west.
What has really happened in eastern Germany can be described best by a simple
model developed by Naujoks [1993], Klodt, Stehn et al. [1994] and Greiner et al.
[1994] (Figure 1). This model allows to distinguish between the demand effects
that have risen in the short run and the supply effects from factor movements that
might take longer to materialize. In characterizing the situation before unification
it is assumed that the GDR economy produced two goods: tradables T and non-
tradables NT. Given the structure of relative prices PDDR the allocation was de-
termined by a. Opening up the economy shifted PDDR to Pw and a to b. The rea-
son is that producers of tradables which were exposed to external competition
have not been able to pass on the cost of wage increases to their customers. Pro-
ducers of non-tradables were shielded from competition and have been able to
increase prices with less difficulty.
Figure 1 - Relative Price Changes and Structural Change in a Two Sector Model
of the Eastern German Economy
Source: Klodt, Stehn et al. [1994].Without transfers from the west consumption possibilities of easterners would
have been limited by the output b. With transfers they are able to consume more
i
than they produce. This is illustrated by a move of the budget line from Pw to P'w
and of the consumption point from b to c. Since the prices for tradables are given
by the world market, this leads once again to a change of relative prices from P'w
to P'NBL- By that the allocation between T and AT is shifted once again from b to
c'.
It is important to understand that the shift from tradables to non-tradables is, in
terms of output and employment, by far no zero-sum game for the eastern Ger-
man economy. In the short run, it is even a negative-sum game. Usually, the share
of tradables in total absorption is much higher than the share of non-tradables. As
a result, transfers have mainly been used to purchase tradables from abroad rather
than stimulate the output in the non-tradable sector. Thus, they have increased the
deficit of the external account. At last they destroyed the little value which so far
has been existing in eastern German factories.
The high transfers are also an obstacle to restructuring the tradable sector of the
eastern German economy and, hence, to reducing the trade deficit. Given high la-
bour costs in the east, investors have, if at all, more incentives to commit to the
non-tradable sector rather than to the tradable sector. In other words: transfers
have caused immense allocative distortions which can be labelled as a Dutch dis-
ease phenomenon [Greiner et al. 1994, Siebert 1995].
Ill Privatization and Subsidization: Two-Pronged Policy to Restructure the
Economy
The basic philosophy of German economic unification, which combined ideal and
wrong conditions has been that money can buy anything, even time. For political7
and economic reasons there has not been the time for adopting a gradualistic
strategy. Thus politicians opted for applying the Big Bang approach. From the
beginning, the aspirations of east Germans have been high: they expected to reach
the standard of living of the west Germans nearly overnight. The mass demon-
strations in the GDR, chanting "either the Deutschmark will come to us or we will
go to the Deutschmark", swept away all scruples held by politicians and econo-
mists alike. With an open border this strategy became an imperative to stem the
flow of westbound eastern emigrants.





















































































































Source: Federal Statistical Office.
However, buying time has had a high price for the united Germany. With gross
transfers of about 200bnDM per year, it has shouldered a heavy burden
(Table 1). Since 1991 a wide range of government support schemes have beenestablished in order to give investment incentives or subsidies to prevent firms
from collapse, to improve the infrastructure and, last but not least, to finance job
creation programs and social transfers. The weak point is that two thirds of the
money are devoted to social consumption and only one third to rebuilding the
capital stock. The reduction of western Germany's current account surplus from
107 bn DM in 1989 to a deficit of 34 bn DM indicates that even for a rich brother
it is not easy to grant support on such a large scale.
Policy for German unification, although initially putting much of its trust in the
power of the market has been designed with two spearheads: rapid privatization
of state-owned enterprises and heavy subsidization of investment in the capital
stock.
- '.'. The motivation for rapid privatization had been the need for rapid restructur-
ing and modernization of state-owned companies. It had been recognized
that a government or a government trust agency would not be able to re-
structure a whole economy. Restructuring should start in earnest only after
privatization. Privatization could provide best of all what had been most ur-
; gently needed to create viable firms: entrepreneurial concepts, investment
capital and management skills.
- The motivation for heavy subsidization had been to give incentives for in-
vestors. Early calculations had shown that eastern Germany would need
about two trillion DM accumulated investment in the years to come to bring
up the living standard in the east to that in the west. Without massive incen-
tives it would not have been possible to raise such an enormous amount of
money in such a short span of time.
It is important to understand privatization and subsidization as a package. Privati-
zation of the "people's property" in eastern Germany did cost an enormousamount of money. This has not only been due to the poor state of the old socialist
companies which frequently only had a negative value. Privatization has been an
instrument of structural and social policy as well. By privatization many thou-
sands of companies obtained capital for new investments which were necessary
for initiating a promising entrepreneurial start. Even dyed-in-the-wool free mar-
keters would agree that without massive government support the process of unifi-
cation could have easily ended in a fiasco. Then costs would have been insup-
portable in the end.
1 Privatization
Privatization had been considered as "the heart of the transformation process"
[Siebert 1990]. The way unification was being carried out forced policy makers
to go ahead with privatization rapidly and resolutely. This goal did not remain un-
challenged. It was argued that rapid and resolute privatization would lead not
only to low selling prices for assets but also to mass unemployment as private
owners would radically reduce overstaffing [Sinn and Sinn 1991]. However, most
of the state-owned companies were virtually bankrupt. Thus, a slower pace of and
less resolute privatization presumably would have neither stabilized nor even
raised the price of assets nor mitigated the contraction in employment.
The basic philosophy of the Treuhandanstalt (THA), a government trusteeship put
in charge of the firms to be transferred into private property , was: "restructuring
by privatization", which meant "privatization prior to restructuring". The THA ar-
The THA temporarily became the owner of 8,000 companies with more than 45,000 opera-
tional sites, 23,000 shops, hotels, restaurants and cinemas, numerous buildings and real es-
tates which had once belonged to the political parties, mass organizations and public ad-
ministration, 15,000 square miles of agricultural and forestry land — with the task of re-
structuring and privatizing them.10
gued, in accordance with the overwhelming majority of economists, that a gov-
ernment agency would have been overcommitted to restructure many thousands
of ailing companies under time constraint. Meanwhile, the THA has nearly com-
pleted its work. It finished its "operational business" at the end of 1994 after pri-
vatizing about 75 percent of former state businesses (Table 2). This is a very re-
spectable achievement which hardly anyone would have believed possible in the
beginning. However, the number of privatizations is no indicator of whether the
THA worked efficiently — and in accordance with the aims it was required to as-
sume. The results achieved also depend on the quality of its decisions. For every
privatization decision there was always at least one alternative: the THA could
have sold the company to another bidder, could have continued running it a while
longer or could have liquidated it straight away. Its performance can thus only be
evaluated on the basis of a comprehensive analysis which covers all facets of the
privatization process: the aims, the options, the decision-taking process, and only
then, the results achieved.
The thrilling story of privatization cannot be told at length here. Nevertheless,
some fundamental issues of the THA strategy shall be discussed in a critical man-
ner. From the business economist's point of view the task of privatization is a de-
cision-taking problem. Economic decision theory provides clear criteria to show
the actions to be taken in the sale of a company. Usually, the seller has only a
one-dimensional target: to maximize the asset price. However, the THA also had
a highly political task. The Preamble of the THA Law required the THA "not only
to reduce the area of state activity as quickly and as widely as possible by means
of privatization", but also "to render as many companies as possible competitive".
The interested reader will find some publications in English, too [Dodds and Wachter 1993;
Hax 1992; Schmidt 1995; Fischer, Hax and Schneider 1996].11
In all this, the THA was supposed to proceed as quickly as possible, acquire in-
vestment, preserve and create jobs, and —inter alia — realize suitable proceeds
from the sale. It thus had a very-
1 complex bundle of tasks, which frequently
caused serious problems: the aims have been very vague, and partly contradicted
one another. As legal rules had not fixed any hierarchical relationship between the
aims, the THA was in principle free in deciding which companies or other assets
it wished to sell and when, how and to whom.


















































However, the THA adopted a basic rule for privatization: to preserve a company
as far as possible. Therefore it required potential investors to demonstrate con-
vincingly their ability to continue operating the company with a good hope of
success. This greatly restricted the range of possibilities for privatization. Gen-
erally speaking a potential investor was not considered eligible if he intended to12
turn the company to some other use or re-sell it. The THA assumed that such an
investor intended to carry out his project somewhere else if he did not get his turn
in privatization. Without doubt it is hardly possible to justify this focus on pre-
serving companies and production locations on any economic grounds. The THA
itself conceded that possibly such an investor was turned down although offering
a better strategy.
It might be put this way too: the THA was pursuing a privatization strategy which
consisted not only of a complex goal but also of the route leading to it. In the
words of its lady President, its strategy was not selling but purchasing. "We give
preference to a buyer if he is contributing sales channels, if he can close the inno-
vation and technology gap ... as quickly as possible and thus enable the company
to survive" [Breuel 1992]. The THA thus attempted to prevent asset-stripping,
which could have resulted in serious regional employment problems, and was
therefore prepared to make concessions against its final aims if it could thereby
more readily attain its intermediate aims.
It is self-evident that a privatization agency which tends to purchase investors
must be endowed with well filled pockets. The THA was able to serve up a palat-
able lunch without immediately presenting the bill which later was sent to the
taxpayer.
The crucial question is now, how successful the THA has been under those con-
ditions in terms of quality. The THA has contracted about 70,000 investors who
promised about 1.5 mill, jobs and 187 bn DM investments. Two thirds of the
commitments were fixed by a contract and one half was safeguarded by penalties
(Table 3). The THA argues that — on average — the employment and investment
targets were surpassed: until the end of 1993, e.g., about 9,200 of 10,600 con-
tracts with employment guarantees had been examined. 600,000 jobs were main-|@S Institi ita fur We!twirtsch@ft
 1
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tained or created instead of 520,000 guaranteed. However, nearly 1,400 investors
failed their employment targets significantly (Table 4).






1990 | 1991 | 1992 1993 1994
Employment commitments (number)
25,565 411,989 778,468 919,236 974,389
8,203 258,700 580,368 708,560 760,862
Investment commitments (mill. DM)
11,725 41,450 88,043 106,399 142,463
175 13,494 54,828 71,433 107,117
Source: Treuhandanstalt.
















1990 1991 1992 | 1993
Number of examined contracts
38 2,786 7,311 9,205





























It is, of course, much too simple to measure privatization performance by com-
paring targets and realization only. As has been mentioned earlier, the THA had
been endowed with "deep pockets". It had been able to grant price concessions14
for investment and employment guarantees. In this respect it had not been too
risky for investors to commit themselves because they had been compensated for
in advance.
Whatever the judgement may be: the costs of privatization were enormous. Pri-
vatization of a whole economy will make a profit of roughly 70 bn DM only, but
this figure has to be set against the expenditures incurred in the course of privati-
zation and which will total about 340 bn DM. At the end, a net loss of
270 bn DM will be transferred to the state budget (Table 5). Can these high costs
be justified by the benefits attained?








































































The deficit is principally attributable to the mismanagement of the old system,
which drained companies of their financial lifeblood rather than to blame the
THA. However, the question has to be asked if the deficit might not have been
smaller if the THA had pursued privatization exclusively and did not have to
make structural and social policy as well.15
2 Subsidization
While privatization was given high priority as a vehicle for restructuring the
eastern German economy from the early beginning, the demand for financial as-
sistance was heavily underestimated then. One has to remember Chancellor
Dr. Kohl's promise that unification could be financed without tax increase by the
additional economic growth following unification. Many economists and policy
makers expected a new "economic miracle" by comparing the situation in eastern
Germany in 1990 with that of western Germany in 1948 after the currency re-
form. However, this was a fatal miscalculation. Private investors were not hurry-
ing to invest their money in eastern Germany, except in those industries which
promised quick profits such as retail and real estate. As a rule, they had to take
into account the poor state of traffic and communications infrastructure, the diffi-
culties in clearing up the restitution claims and, last but not least, the bottlenecks
in the administration machinery. For these reasons, potential locational advan-
tages of eastern Germany had not come to bear immediately. Consequently, a
range of various instruments had to be utilized to promote companies which had
to battle against huge obstacles in the first years after unification. Without mas-
sive incentives the process of investment would hardly have started quickly.
In 1991-1994, the total amount of public money poured into eastern Germany
was 773 bn DM, of which 210 bn DM in 1994 (Table 6). Certainly, in absolute
terms transfers have obviously reached the peak, and in terms of eastern German
GDP they are clearly declining. Nevertheless, the eastern economy remains
highly dependent on external support. There is a great risk that all the money may
delay or even fail to produce convergence. The German Council of Economic
Experts, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the leading research institutes are warning
the government about subsidies getting out of hand. They ask for gradually run-
ning down support programs before they become a parameter in the companies'16
strategy: "The east German economy today faces the problem of becoming less
dependent on external support and finding its way back to normality. Normality
means that companies can survive without subsidies on the markets, and thereby
earn the means to pay the salaries of their employees ... Despite the fact that east
Germany is still a long way from this kind of normality, the main features for
achieving the final objective must already be put into place today" [German
Council of Economic Experts 1994].
Table 6 - Government's Support
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Source: Federal Ministry of Finance; Deutsche Bundesbank.
Although it is impossible to calculate transfer payments exactly according to their
purpose, one can estimate that roughly two thirds have been allocated to con-
sumptive purposes. The dramatic decline in employment in the first phase of the
transformation process had made it indispensable to soften social consequences
by massive intervention in the labour market such as job creation and early re-
tirement programs. Transfers for financing labour market and social security17
measures amounted to 277 bn DM in 1991-1994. Additional 116bnDM were
spent by the Treuhandanstalt. They include to a great extent hidden wage cost
subsidies.
Transfers for financing public and subsidizing private investments amounted to
286 bn DM which were about 50 percent of total investment. Calculations show
that private investments were subsidized by about one third on average. Clearly,
this has not only boosted investment volumes in general but also generated heavy
distortions with respect to investment structure. Comparing capital stock in east-
ern and western Germany leads to the conclusion that there is a major problem
with the quality of the new capital stock built up in the east as it will become
more capital-intensive than in the west (Table 7). This does not mean that invest-
ments should be of labour-intensive type — which could hardly be competitive in
a high-wage country. But too heavy a commitment to capital-intensive production
equally misses optimal investment allocation.
Table 7 - Capital Investments in Eastern Germany 1991-1994 and Capital
Stock in Western Germany 1992



































Source: Deutsches Institut firr Wirtschaftsforschung.18
IV Capital against Labour: Different Adjustment Paths of Accumulation,
Production and Employment
As Siebert [1995] emphasized, economic development in eastern Germany is
characterized by different time paths which mirror the difficult task of rebuilding
the economy from scratch under the conditions of rapid wage convergence. We
find a J-curve of adjustment in capital stock, a U-curve of adjustment in produc-
tion and an L/curve of adjustment in employment. This is fully in line with theore-
tical considerations: renewing the capital stock must play the decisive role in the
adjustment process — as a precondition to a gradual expansion of production
and, with some delay, a stabilization of employment.
1 The J -Curve of Capital Accumulation
Calculations of eastern Germany's capital stock are difficult mainly due to the
problem of valuing investments done before unification and of scrappings made
thereafter. A large part of the existing capital stock was depreciated by the modus
of unification. Rough calculations show that the lion's share of write-downs had
to be taken into account immediately,
5 while the rest has to be distributed over a
number of years. Considering the period 1991-1994, a large amount of the old
capital stock in the enterprise sector became obsolete in 1992 when unit labour
costs reached their peak (Figure 2).
Approximately one third of the existing capital of 1.2 bn DM was depreciated in summer
1990 when the German Economic, Monetary and Social Union was established.19
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"Enterprise sector without housing; yearly averages in 1991 prices.
Source: Deutsches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung.20
While in the period 1990-1992 scrapping of capital goods exceeded accruals,
since 1993 accruals have been greater than scrappings. In 1994 the capital stock
increased with a double digit rate. Meanwhile, about 80 percent of the total capi-
tal stock in the enterprise sector in eastern Germany has been renewed com-
pletely. Nevertheless, it accounts for only one tenth of the overall German capital
stock whereas it should account for one fifth according to eastern Germany's
share in population.
It is evident that the time eastern Germany needs to catch up depends on the fu-
ture growth of the capital stock — or, more precisely, on the difference in future
growth rates of the capital stock in eastern and western Germany. Assuming that
the eastern German per capita capital stock has presently reached 50 percent of
the western German stock, a growth differential of 6-7 percent would be neces-
sary to close the gap completely within a decade. This is a very ambitious, though
not unattainable target.
2 The U-Curve of Production
Rebuilding the capital stock is a precondition for the revival of output. However,
the time path of output is different from that of capital stock mainly for two rea-
sons: first, it needs some time until an investment is completed, and second, it
needs some more time until new capacities can be employed fully, as it is always
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Output in eastern German manufacturing
6 has described a U-shaped curve: after a
sharp decline in the second half of 1990 output was (apart from seasonal fluctua-
tions) stagnant in 1991 and 1992, and has been moderately but steadily increasing
from the start of 1993 (Figure 3). Nevertheless, at the end of 1994 the index of
net production has passed the pre-unifioation level. In general terms manufactur-
ing is still the Achilles heel of the eastern German economy. There remains a
significant number of companies in which order book entries and the level of ca-
pacity utilization are rather unsatisfactory.
In spite of restructuring and modernization, many companies suffer from a serious
lack of profitability, as they must pay wages that exceed productivity. If perma-
nent subsidization should be avoided, more and more companies must now start
to work profitable under their own steam. This can only occur if investment ac-
tivity remains on a high level and, hence, the rate of productivity growth substan-
tially exceeds that of wage increases.
3 The L-Curve of Employment
Because of the large gap between labour costs and labour productivity (Figure 4)
the adjustment profile of employment is very similar to an L-curve rather than a
U-curve corresponding to the output profile. Employment, including persons in
labour market schemes, reached the bottom in 1992, but has not clearly passed
the turning point until now. Total employment dropped from nearly 10 million at
the beginning of 1990 to 6.4 million persons at the end of 1992, and to 6.3 million
persons at the end of 1994 (Figure 5).
In manufacturing the adjustment of production depends much more on the adjustment of the
capital stock than in other industries, especially in services. In terms of GDP, the adjustment
profile of output is more like a J-curve rather than a U-curve as output in services has
started to increase immediately.23
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aWages per employee, productivity per employed person. -
 b2nd half-year.
Source: Federal Statistical Office.
The labour market situation is, in fact, the key challenge for policy makers. It is a
pretty cold comfort that the fall in employment has come to a halt and that the
number of registered and concealed unemployees fell from about 2.7 million in
1993 to about 2.4 million in 1994. It is not easy to imagine in which areas a suf-
ficient number of jobs could be created — according to its size of population
eastern Germany should have at least 7.5 million jobs. With unit labour costs of
about 80 percent of western German standards an expansion of labour-intensive
production cannot be expected. Quite the reverse is true. Newly established
working places are mainly in capital-intensive production. As far as they are ex-
posed to international competition they can only succeed through permanent la-
bour-saving investment rather than through labour-creating investment.24
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Source: Federal Labour Market Office.
V Non-Tradables Beat Tradables: A Case of Dutch Disease
During the last five years eastern German economy has experienced not only a
sharp contraction of output — followed by a moderate expansion — but has also
had to undergo considerable structural changes. Closer examination reveals a
clear-cut pattern: industries which sell their products mainly in local or regional
markets have increased their share in total output, while industries producing for
nation-wide or world-wide markets have lost in importance. The massive transfer
payment has caused a Dutch-disease phenomenon.
The non-tradable sector, not the tradable sector, has attracted most of the capital
and qualified labour. For instance, in eastern Germany the share of construction
(and also of construction related industries) is twice as high as in western Ger-25
many (Table 8). The share of manufacturing, however, is only half as high. In a
way, eastern Germany experienced a dramatic de-industrialization — and is still
waiting for a new re-industrialization.
Table 8 - Gross Value Added and Employment in Eastern Germany by Sectors
































"In current prices (1st half of 1990 in GDR-Mark)

















































































Source: Federal Statistical Office.
The orientation of the eastern German industry towards local and regional mar-
kets is concomitant with the fact that turnover on domestic markets has increased
sharply, whereas it has declined on foreign markets. In 1994, foreign sales as a
proportion of total sales reached only around 12 percent; while the western Ger-
man industry, with a proportion of 37 percent, exported twice as much. A rough
calculation shows that 57 percent of total sales by eastern German companies26
have been non-tradables.
7 For comparison: for western German companies this
share has usually been much lower, e.g. 37 percent in 1994. These figures indi-
cate that a competitive export base has not yet been established. The companies
have lost most of their traditional export markets in the former socialist econo-
mies, but until now they have not found access to those of western market
economies. The re-integration of a former socialist economy into the world econ-
omy needs some time which cannot be bought with money.
Table 9 - Sales Structure
8 of Eastern and Western German Manufacturing
























Source: Federal Statistical Office.
VI Capital or Wage Subsidies: The Key Policy Question
While in the sense of a causal therapy subsidies have been widely accepted as a
policy instrument in eastern Germany, the question as to what kind of subsidies
should be preferred has remained controversial. For Hallet, Ma and Melitz
[1994], e.g., the key policy question is: how can the balance be shifted in a politi-
cally acceptable way from wage convergence to employment convergence. "The
question ... is not whether western support continues but whether it does so in a
The classification of branches as tradables and non-tradables in terms of their trade intensity
is based on west German trade statistics for the years 1980-1990.27
way which both shows wage convergence and, by reducing marginal costs of la-
bour, increases the efficient level of eastern employment". like many other An-
glo-Saxon economists, they have pronounced themselves in favour of wage sub-
sidies rather than capital subsidies [Akerlof et al. 1991; Begg and Portes 1992;
Wolf 1992]. Interestingly enough, the overwhelming majority of German econo-
mists and politicians have always argued that wage subsidies could not be the
right answer. In their opinion the most striking objection is that with regard to un-
employment wage subsidies can only be used to palliate the symptoms rather than
to cure the causes. However, the front line against this instrument seems to be
weakening as the political establishment falls increasingly under pressure to es-
tablish what is called an active labour market policy.
To put the matter in a nutshell, there are three major deficiencies of wage subsi-
dies as an instrument for supporting the adjustment process [Schmidt and Nau-
joks 1995]. Wage subsidies
- discriminate against viable and competitive enterprises;
- distort incentives for adjustment, thus causing inefficient structures of pro-
duction;
tend to degenerate into a self-perpetuating mechanism that leads to perma-
nent intervention in the labour market [Schmidt and Sander 1993].
The policy for German economic unification is defined in terms of the long run
economic performance, and that certainly is the right way. Then the relevant
question to be asked is: how can the profitability of investment best be raised in
eastern Germany? From a theoretical point of view the answer is clear: in the long
run capital subsidies are superior to wage subsidies. They will massively direct
capital from the west to the east — and that is the only way to catch up quickly.28
A reduction in labour costs, however, will hamper the renewal of the capital
stock, especially if the subsidies are intended to be granted only temporarily.29
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